Until the banking reform in 1936, banks and industrial companies in Italy were strongly intertwined (both in terms of ownership and interlocking directorates). Using Imita.db -a large dataset containing data on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint stock companies -this paper analyses what would have happened to the Italian corporate network in the years 1913, 1921, 1927 and 1936 if the German type universal banks and their directors would have not been there. Our test shows that new centers of the system would have emerged (financial and electricity and phone companies), confirming the interconnected nature of the Italian capitalism. We also analyze two industries, textiles and iron and steel, characterized by different labor-to-capital intensities to check for sectoral differences. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that local banks were important in funding both industries. Overall we call into question the role of universal banks as a driver of Italian industrialization.
Introduction
The relationship between banks and industry and the role of the German-type universal banks in fostering Italy's industrialization in the early twentieth century has been widely debated in Italian economic historiography. The first contribution can be traced back to Grifone's (1945) formulation on the centrality of finance capital in the Italian corporate system. This view was inspired by Hilferding's (1910) theory of finance capital and stated that the financial control of credit flows and, more rarely, part of the firm's equity, enables banks to determine the behavior of industrial firms. This approach identifies three major channels of bank influence over industrial companies: capital participation, sharing of board seats and monitoring over day-to-day financial affairs. In his path breaking contribution, Gerschenkron (1962) singled out the main universal banks, Banca Commerciale and Credito Italiano founded in the 1890s with German capital and Banco di Roma founded in 1880, as one of the major cause of Italy's big spurt of the 1896-1908 period. In his view, these banks functioned as a "substitutive factor" that prompted Italy's economic growth by providing a significant financial support and an qualified managerial advice to the major industrial companies of the country, especially in modern capital-intensive sectors such as steel, heavy engineering, electricity, shipping and so on. According to Gerschenkron, their contribution was outstanding particularly on the diffusion of modern banking techniques within a backward environment.
Subsequently, the role of universal banks has been reconsidered by the various contributions by Confalonieri (1974 Confalonieri ( -76, 1982 Confalonieri ( , 1992 Confalonieri ( , 1997 . He provides little support for Gerschenkron's hypothesis, at least for the period before WWI, by stressing the continuity between the new German-type universal banks and their French-style antecedents as the former hired most of the staff and followed the practices of the latter. Confalonieri argues that the Italian universal banks were more concerned with standard banking activities, i.e. lent money on a project by project basis, than with planning an overall industrial strategy. Last but not least, Confalonieri maintains that the universal banks avoided permanent ownership of industrial companies and they accepted shares only as guarantee for loans. This strategy collapsed when the post-WWI crisis made impossible for many companies to repay their debts to banks. Thus the banks unwillingly became the real owners of much of the "militaryindustrial complex" and of several important firms in other industries. When the Great Depression struck, the entire system collapsed and both the banks and their industrial clients were bailed out by the State.
Later on, the first quantitative contributions provided by Fohlin (1998 Fohlin ( , 1999 contributed to shed light on the issue. First of all, she shows that the universal banks tend to establish their networks on large well established companies instead of trying to create connections with promising, but risky, small firms, which needed venture capital. She also finds that firms belonging to the universal banks' networks performed similarly -in terms of growth of financial capital, fixed assets and revenues -to those lacking the potential benefit of bank affiliation. This latter point is also confirmed by Battilani (1995) in a case studies on a sample of cotton firms in the 1920s. To sum up, we can say that the "Gershenkronian" tale is contradict by the results obtained by Fohlin, who suggests that the German style universal banks played a limited role in fostering the investment of Italian firms during the first wave of industrialization. Accordingly, the role of universal banks as one of the most powerful engine of growth must be reconsidered.
In recent years some studies have analyzed the characteristics of the Italian corporate system on the basis of the new "law and finance" theory (La Porta et al. 1998 Porta et al. , 1999 Porta et al. , 2008 This approach suggests that legal protection of investors is the crucial determinant of capital market development, ownership concentration, and organizational structures and argues that legal protection is ultimately a by-product of a country's legal origins. According to this view, if a country has a high shareholding protection, as typical of the Common Law regulation, its economy will be characterized by a higher development of the stock market and an incidence of widely held companies à la Berle and Means (1932) . In contrast, countries with a low shareholders protection, as typical of the Civil Law regulation, are generally characterized by higher ownership concentration, a greater role of the banks and the state, and to a larger resorting to non-market relationships for inter-firm coordination.
Despite the degree of investor protection improved considerably along the 20 th century, according to La Porta et al. (1998) Italy still ranked, at the eve of the 21 st century, as one of the worst performers among industrial nations as concerns legal safeguard for investors. In the period covered by this paper, the Italian stock market was virtually self-regulated. Firms could issue shares with multiple votes and use cross-shareholdings without limitation. Banks were allowed (until the 1936 banking law) to own industrial companies, lend money at shortand long-term, underwrite industrial security issues, and hold deposits. Effectively, banks (and especially the largest universal banks) served the role of venture capitalists, investment and commercial banks. Until the Civil Code of 1942, there were no rules describing the extent of information disclosure that companies had to provide to shareholders (Aganin and Volpin 2003) .
Recent historiography puts the analysis of the bank and industry relationship in the frame of the corporate governance perspective. Thus, Battilossi (2009) and Brambilla (2012) argue that unsound practices by the universal banks in the interwar years were permitted and to some extent enhanced by the systematic failures of public and private governance institutions to act as disciplinary devices for banks' risk-taking. In particular, these authors point that, in order to reject takeover attempts by, respectively, the Ansaldo group and the Fiat-Snia groups, Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano assigned their own equities to ad hoc holding companies, which were owned by the banks themselves and by their "allied groups", i.e., large industrial concerns that were also their larger borrowers. Thus, universal banks entered into close and long-run relationships with financed firms that insulated managers from external controls, favoured the elimination of prudential constraints, and increased the potential for conflicts of interest as industrial groups were co-opted among their controlling owners. This degeneration of relationship finance was epitomized by a pathological escalation of equity stakes, possibly further encouraged by expectations that liquidity mismanagement would have been fixed once again by lack of supervision and unconditional bail-outs by monetary authorities when macroeconomic conditions eventually improved.
Despite the relevance of the relationships between banks and industry for the Italian economic historiography, only very few studies have analyzed the sharing of board members -that is, the system of interlocks -between banks and industrial companies in the period prior to WWII. 1 A study by Vasta and Baccini (1997) -using a large sample of more than 4,000 Italian joint-stock companies -held that the Italian corporate network does not seem to have been characterized by a strong centrality of banks as it was commonly believed. The location of banks at the center of the network could be detected in 1911 and even more in 1927, but this was no longer the case in 1936, after the collapse of the universal banks. By that time, insurance companies and utility companies had replaced banks at the center of the system (Baccini and Vasta 1995) . These authors also find that a highly stable system of interlocks existed in parallel to that centered on the banking system, and remained substantially unchanged over the years. However, some doubts have been cast on the significance of these results because the universal banks were often represented on the boards of industrial firms by managers, the so-called fiduciaries, who were not themselves members of the board of the banks (Pino Pongolini 1991; Cohen and Federico 2001) .
This article investigates the links between the Italian universal banks and the corporate economy by focusing on cross-memberships in boards of directors of joint stock companies (interlocking directorates). This approach, which has its origin in modern sociology, gained, in the last decades, significant spaces in all social sciences, including economics and, with a certain delay, also in economic and business history. 2 The use of interlocking directorship technique can play a dual role by complementing, on the one hand, the traditional case-study method and, on the other hand, by allowing broad overviews of the corporate systems under investigation, which also helps the verification of different theoretical perspectives.
This paper first analyzes the structure of the Italian corporate network in four benchmark years -1913, 1921, 1927 and 1936 -using Imita.db, a large dataset containing information on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint-stock companies. Then it presents a counterfactual experiment, by showing what would happen to the network if the universal banks and all their directors had been eliminated. This analysis is replicated for the textile and iron and steel industries, characterized by different labor-to-capital intensities, to check for sectoral differences. The paper is organized as follows: after this Introduction, Section 2 describes the data and the sources and Section 3 illustrates the methodology utilized for this study. Sections 4 presents the results of our counterfactual tests, while Section 5 focuses on actor centrality. Section 6 replicates the counterfactual exercise for two industrial sectors (textiles and iron and steel). Lastly, Section 7 concludes.
Data and sources
The source we used for this work is 4 The source includes all the joint-stock companies listed on one of the Italian stock exchanges, together with those companies located in Italy whose share capital at the closure of the last balance was higher than a set threshold, which varied from year to year. 5 On the whole, the dataset contains data on more than 38,000 companies, almost 300,000 directors, and more than 100,000 balance sheets. Representativeness, in terms of capital, is very high as the sample covers well over 90 percent of the total universe in all but the first benchmark year, 1911, for which the share is around 85 percent. In this paper, we focus on the benchmark years 1913, 1921, 1927 and 1936. As for the directors, we used only data for members of a board of directors in the strict sense, leaving out the members of Collegi sindacali. 6 We have carefully standardized the names of the directors to make them as homogeneous as possible. However, we estimate that the information on boards of directors contained in Imita.db has a margin of error of about 1 percent, as is the case with other similar databases (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985) . These errors are mainly due to cases of homonymy, misprints, or shortcomings in the source.
Methodology
Starting from the actual networks we analyze and test -for each benchmark yearsome counterfactual hypotheses about the network structure. In particular, starting from a defined network and considering a counterfactual, we consider an initial two way matrix related to the network, and then we consider a second matrix related to the counterfactual effects. The effects of the change could be distinguished between global and local. Global effects can be referred to the structural effects in the entire network, whereas local effects are related to the position of the single node in the network. The global effects of the network counterfactuals are related to network stability and network connectedness, whereas the local effects are related to the different stability and robustness to change of the communication 3 Imita.db is one of the worldwide largest datasets on joint-stock companies in historical perspective. For details on the database, see: Vasta (2006) The database is available on line: http://imitadb.unisi.it 4 Data for companies and boards of directors are available for 1911, 1913, 1921, 1927, 1936, 1952, 1960, 1972, and 1983 ; for balance sheets, time series are available for the span from 1900 to 1971 and for 1982 and 1983. 5 The threshold was set at 1 million Italian lire until 1940, with the sole exception of 1914, when it amounted to 500,000 lire. 6 Collegi sindacali are special committees of auditors, and are somehow similar to supervisory boards (Scott 1985) . channels into the network. In particular, it is possible to consider the role of the different nodes in a network by these types of simulation experiment is possible to analyze the impact of changes into the roles of the network (Borgatti 2003 (Borgatti , 2005 (Borgatti , 2006 In addition to the analysis of the whole networks, we also compare interlocking directorates in two sectors (textiles and iron and steel) that are characterized by different factor intensity: the former is labor-intensive whereas the latter is capital-intensive. We expect that banks are considerably more connected with the iron and steel sector because it requires more capital for investment. Sharing board members enhances the ability of the banks to monitor the performance of the companies and therefore the possibility of getting their money back. For both sectors we performed the counterfactual described above for each benchmark year. In the Appendix we provide summary statistics of all these networks. Table 1 The substantial increase in the connectedness and complexity of the network from 1913 to 1927 and its subsequent decline in 1936 seem to contradict the predictions of the "law and finance" approach. In fact, in the absence of any significant change in degree of investor 9 The diameter is the longest geodesics of the network, i.e., the length of the path between the two most distant nodes (De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2011). 10 The Zagreb Index (M1) calculates the sum of the squares of vertex degree, given the graph adjacency matrix. The Zagreb Index (M2) computes the sum of vertex degrees obtained by taking into account all the pairs of adjacent vertices, given the graph adjacency matrix as well. 11 The Randic Index is given by the summation of all products of the vertices degree, taking the inverse root of each term. 12 The index of relinking measures the relinking in a specific network: every semicycle of a p-graph corresponds to a relinking relationship (Batagelj and Mrvar 2008) . 13 The Platt Index measures the occurrence of the two-edge sub-graph to measure the complexity of a network. 14 The average degree of a node is the number of edges connected to it.
The structure of the network
protection over the period analyzed, according to this theory there should have been no relevant change in the resorting to non-market forms of inter-firm coordination, such as corporate interlocks and especially bank-centered ones.
The Counterfactual exercise changes the network structure to different extents across benchmark years. As expected, the values of two Zagreb Indexes in the Counterfactual are much lower than in the actual networks in all benchmark years. The gap increases constantly from 1913 to 1921 and to 1927, when the removal of the individuals with at least one directorship in a universal bank has the stronger effect in reducing the connectedness and complexity of the network. Then, in 1936 the effect of this exercise declines as the difference between the complexity of the two networks (actual and counterfactual) fades with regard to the previous benchmark year. It is also worth noticing that the variation over time of the Zagreb indexes is much lower for the counterfactual network than for the real one. The average degree shows the same pattern in all benchmark years, even though the difference is much lower than for the Zagreb indexes. We can notice that the average degree in the counterfactuals has rather high values in absolute terms, ranging from 9.9 in 1936 to 12.8 in 1921. They are only slightly lower (with the difference ranging from 11% in 1936 to 34% in 1927) and more stable than those in the actual networks. This seems to show that a stable system of interlocks existed in parallel to that centered on the universal banks.
Actor centrality
In network analysis it is assumed that actors that are central have better access to information, better opportunities to spread information and someway a "power" to coordinate the whole network. We use nBetweenness as the measure to calculate the centrality of firms.
This measure is based on the idea that a firm is more central if it is more important as an intermediary in the communication network. So it calculates for each actor (company) the number of shortest paths between any pairs of actors in the network that pass through this actor (De Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj 2011). The pattern in 1921 in similar: stability in the very first ranks, a number of shifts due to removal of the universal banks, and the changes from the middle to the bottom of the ranking 15 In fact, we have 1, 243 companies in 1913, 3,076 in 1921, 4,477 in 1927 and 4,244 in 1936. ( As noted before, 1927 is the benchmark year in which universal banks had the largest influence in the network. Not surprisingly, this is also the year in which removing their interlockers has the widest effect. In Table 5 we find that a half of the most central companies -ten out of twenty -went out of the top twenty in the Counterfactual and were replaced by as many companies.
In the last experiment (1936 , Table 6 sharply in 1936, after the universal banks had been severely struck by the Great Depression and had been eventually bailed out by the big state-owned holding Iri (Toniolo 1980; Zamagni 1993) . Nonetheless, the demise of the universal banks did not lead to a disentangling of the network, as new centers with a high value of nBetweenness emerged and played a key role in assuring the cohesion of the system. Our counterfactual experiments support Vasta and Baccini's (1997) claim that a sizeable and stable system of interlocks existed in parallel, or as a complement, to that hinged on the universal banks. This can be detected in all benchmark years, including 1927, when the influence of the universal banks was higher. Until 1927, such a system of interlocks extraneous to the universal banks was mainly centered on electricity companies, some large steel and trade companies and the Banca d'Italia, at that time a jointstock bank. In 1936, it still hinged on electricity companies together with some new actorssuch as insurance companies and some mandatory syndicates -that had taken up a central role.
Comparing labor-and capital-intensive industries
In this section we analyze the bank-industry relationship in two sectors characterized by different relative intensities of factors of production: textiles and iron and steel. The former is labor-intensive whereas the latter is capital-intensive. In performing this analysis, for each benchmark year we construct two sub-networks: in the former case we take all the banks and all the textile companies, whereas in the latter case we take the banks mentioned above and all the iron and steel companies. 16 The methodology devised for the actual and counterfactual networks is replicated for these sub-networks. Table 7 reports the statistics of these smaller sub-networks. 17 The Zagreb Indexes, the Randic Index and the average degree show higher values for the textile actual sub-networks than for the iron and steel ones. For the two former indexes, these results are possibly due to the smaller size of the iron and steel sub-network compared with all the other networks considered so far. They also possibly reflect the fact that interlocking directorates were a common practice also in such a labor intensive industry as textiles. However, it is worth noticing that the average degree, which is a normalized index whose value is not affected by the size of the sample, shows higher values for the iron and steel sub-networks in all the benchmarks considered, even if the gap with respect to the textile networks is narrow. Perhaps surprisingly, the counterfactual exercise has stronger effect for the textile network, to probably underscore that the links generated by universal banks' directors were more relevant for the labor-intensive sub-network. This result probably reflects also the fact that cotton mills, which constituted a sizeable proportion of textiles companies, were a capital intensive industry in the Italian corporate economy at that time, whereas the iron and steel industry does not include only the largest steelworks such as Ilva and Terni, but also several smaller ironworks which used much less capital intensive production technology. Table 8 reports the distribution of mean betweenness for the sub-netwoks. Compared with the whole networks the picture is somehow different. We find that the 9 th decile has a much higher value in these sub-networks than in the main ones, whereas this is not always true for the other. Moreover, the distribution is more stable for textiles when we compare the 16 In the Istat Ateco 91 classification that is used in our dataset, textile companies are coded from 17.1 to 18.2, iron and steel companies from 27.1 to 27.5, and banks 65.1. 17 In 1913 we have 209 and 101 companies in the textile and iron and steel sectors, respectively; which become 533 and 292 in 1927, 698 and 350 in 1927, 511 and 216 in 1936. actual sub-networks with the Counterfactual than for iron and steel. The latter, in particular, shows a reduction of the mean nBetweenness in the highest percentile.
We observe three main findings: first, the pattern of the results is similar to those found earlier for the general network, as the effect of a counterfactual shock is increasing from 1913 to 1927 and drops in 1936. Second, and this appears surprising, the effect of a counterfactual shock is stronger on the structure of the banks-textiles sub-network than on the banks-iron and steel industry one. Third, many non-universal, small local banks appear among the most central companies, and this feature grows over time with the same pattern of universal banks, and it is more pronounced in the iron and steel than in the textile industry.
In 1913 for textile (Table 9) , we find two universal and three local banks (plus Banca d'Italia) among the twenty most central companies, whereas we find three universal banks and seven other banks in the iron and steel network. The Counterfactual causes some strong changes, more in the textile than in iron and steel, with values of nBetweenness that are higher in the former than in the latter. This effect is possibly due to the smaller role of universal banks in the iron and steel industry (in the real network they are ranked relatively lower than in textiles) and by the larger role of local banks that tend to stabilize the network.
In 1921 (Table 10 ) banks are more represented in both sectors. Universal banks play a central role in both networks. Local banks are marginal in the textile sub-network, while having a much higher incidence in the iron and steel one. The counterfactual shock causes serious changes in the ranking, whereas the values of nBetweenness are not generally lowered. The large effect in the ranking is also exemplified by the considerable churning of companies that were ranked among the top-twenty in the real network, which are replaced by other firms in the counterfactual.
1927 is confirmed as the year in which the relationship between industrial companies and banks reaches the maximum (Table 11 ). Among the twenty more central companies for nBetweenness, there are twelve banks (of which three universal banks) in the textile subnetwork and fifteen (of which once again three universal banks) in the iron and steel one.
nBetweennes is relatively higher in the capital-intensive industry than in the textile sector.
Churning is very high in both counterfactuals and industries.
In 1936 the industry-universal bank relationship is almost ended (Table 12) . We find five banks in the textile ranking, and nine in the iron and steel ranking. In both cases there is only one universal bank (Banca Commerciale Italiana), whereas the other two (Credito Italiano and Banco di Roma dropped out of the top twenty. The features that we have previously observed in the other experiments are still here, together with a much reduced churning.
The overall result that emerges from the analysis of the bank-industry relationship in the textile and iron and steel sectors is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, interlocking directorates were not limited to the larger banks (especially universal banks) and to the larger firms operating in capital-intensive industries. Instead, we have found that the sharing of board members was a common practice in Italian capitalism which involved to a large extent also small local banks and small firms operating in labor-intensive industries. This suggests that another peculiarity of Italian capitalism, i.e., the presumed dwarfism of its entrepreneurial base, could at least in part be reconsidered. In fact, as interlocking directorates are an element that makes it possible to broaden a firm's boundaries, we can assert that at least some of the Italian small firms were less small than it was commonly believed.
In particular, our counterfactual experiments make us reconsider the respective roles of The central bank played a decisive role in this respect as after WWII it prompted a restructuring of the banking system to strengthen the local banks that funded small firms clustered in the industrial districts in the North-Eastern areas of the country. The growth of the former was strongly associated to that of the latter. In fact, throughout the post-WWII period the national banks within industrial districts had a much lower share of the local credit market than elsewhere. Lower assessment, monitoring, and enforcement costs, and social connections between local banks' managers and local entrepreneurs gave local banks a competitive edge within the industrial districts. Bank competition was restricted to prevent an increase in industrial concentration since it was felt that if the small firms were deprived of necessary credit they would be forced to merge with the larger firms (Conti and Ferri 1997; Conti 1999; Carnevali 2005) .
Instead, our analysis has shown that prior to WWII universal banks were less central than it was commonly believed and that in some regions of the North (Lombardy and some areas of Piedmont and Veneto) small local banks had established strong ties with industrial companies already in the 1910s. The strength of these ties grew in the interwar years. A dense web of ties between local banks and industrial companies can be detected for both a laborintensive industry as textiles (and this could be expected) and, to a larger extent, for a capital intensive industry as iron and steel (and this appears surprising).
This probably indicates that the competitive advantage of local banks -lower assessment, monitoring, and enforcement costs, and social connections between local banks' managers and local entrepreneurs -that have been emphasized in the literature to explain the growth of the post-WWII industrial district of the North-East of the country were already at work since at least the 1910s also in the regions of Italy's first industrialization, especially in Lombardy. They seem to have played a role in fostering Italy's industrial spurt prior to WWI, and also in the 1920s, which has not received an adequate recognition by historiography.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the links between the universal banks and the corporate economy in Italy by focusing on cross-memberships in boards of directors of joint-stock companies (interlocking directorates). It has first analyzed the structure of the Italian corporate network in four benchmark years : 1913, 1921, 1927 and 1936 This feature grows over time and is more pronounced in the iron and steel than in the textile industry.
Thus, it does not seem that the universal banks had higher propensity to be linked to capital-intensive iron and steel companies than to labor-intensive textile ones. At the same time, financing industrialization was not limited to a few large universal banks, but was a common practice (at least in the North) that involved many smaller local banks which in turn developed a dense web of ties with industrial companies. 908 Note: n*ln(n) measures the diameter of the graph. Total adjacency index is the number of edges in a network. Zagreb Indices M1 and M2 and Radic Index are connectivity indices that allow comparing the connectivity of different networks. Platt Index measures the occurrence of the two-edge sub-graph to measure the complexity of a network. The Index of relinking measures the relinking in a specific network: a semicycle of a p-graph can correspond to a relinking relationship. The Average Degree measures the average number of companies to which each one is interlocked. 
